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Abstract:  
We study the impact of political institutions on foreign firms’ choice of their U.S. cross-
listing venue. Using two measures of political institutions (an index of political rights and 
a political constraint index) and controlling for various firm-level and country-level 
characteristics, we show that foreign firms from countries with weak political institutions 
are more likely to cross-list in the U.S. via the over-the-counter market and less likely to 
opt for an exchange-listed program (i.e., New York, Nasdaq, and AMEX). 
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Do political institutions affect the choice of the U.S. cross-listing venue? 
1. Introduction 
Foreign firms from a wide set of countries continue to cross-list their shares on the U.S. markets. 
Firms can cross-list their shares in the U.S. through American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) or 
direct listings. Firms that decide to cross-list on U.S. markets can choose exchange-listed 
programs that are traded on one of the major U.S. exchanges (i.e., NYSE, Nasdaq, and AMEX) 
and mainly consist of Level II and III ADRs and direct listings.  Alternatively, foreign firms can 
choose unlisted programs that are traded on the over-the-counter (OTC) market (including Level 
I ADRs) or on Private Offerings, Resales and Trading through Automated Linkages (PORTAL), 
also called Rule 144A. Indeed, in 2010, 39 foreign firms, nearly three times more than in 2009, 
chose to cross-list on the major U.S. exchanges through ADR programs. Moreover, in 2010, 60 
foreign firms from 23 countries chose OTC depositary receipt programs. As of December 2010, 
407 depositary receipts were listed on NYSE and Nasdaq and 779 OTC depositary receipts were 
available to investors. According to the latest U.S. Federal Reserve statistics and Bank of New 
York Mellon estimates, depositary receipts accounted for 6.4% of all equity portfolio investment 
in the U.S. at the end of 2010.
1
 
Foreign firms choose to cross-list on U.S. markets for many reasons, including raising new funds 
at a lower cost (Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Lins et al., 2005; Doidge et al., 2009), increasing 
their visibility (Baker et al., 2002), improving the liquidity of their shares and broadening their 
shareholder base (Pagano et al., 2002; Aggarwal et al., 2007), and bonding themselves to 
stringent U.S. rules to protect their minority shareholders when the legal institutions of their 
domestic countries are weak (e.g., Coffee, 1999; Stulz, 1999; Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Doidge 
2004; Doidge et al., 2004, 2009). The testing of this “bonding” hypothesis has led to a 
burgeoning empirical literature on the role of legal institutions in determining the choice of a 
U.S. cross-listing venue (e.g., Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Boubakri et al., 2010). However, the 
impact of political institutions on the U.S. cross-listing decision and the choice of the U.S. cross-
listing venue has not yet been examined. The objective of this paper is to fill this gap and to 
                                                          
1 Source: The Depositary Receipt Market: 2010 Yearbook, February 2011, BNY Mellon, Depositary Receipts. These 
statistics do not include direct listing, which is mainly used by Canadian firms.  
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examine how political institutions affect the choice of the U.S. cross-listing venue (OTC, 
PORTAL, and exchange-listed programs).  
In the same way as the literature has highlighted the role of political institutions in the financial 
development of countries (e.g., Roe and Siegel, 2009, 2011; Keefer, 2008; Rajan and Zingales, 
2003), recent studies have examined the impact of political institutions on credit spreads, gross 
spreads of IPOs, and equity trading costs. For example, Qi et al. (2010), using a political rights 
index, find that the cost of debt is higher for firms originating in countries with weaker political 
rights. Chen and Hao (2011) find that political institutions in the issuers’ home markets affect the 
underwriters’ gross spreads of ADR IPOs. In the same vein, Eleswarapu and Venkataraman 
(2006) show that the trading costs of NYSE-listed ADRs are lower for foreign firms domiciled in 
countries with more efficient judicial systems, better accounting standards, and more stable 
political systems. To our knowledge, no study has yet examined the direct link between political 
institutions and the choice of the U.S. cross-listing venue; this paper is thus the first to assess this 
relation. 
In their study of corporate transparency, defined as the widespread availability of firm-specific 
information to those outside the publicly-traded firm, Bushman et al. (2004) find that financial 
transparency in a given country is primarily related to the political regime of that country. More 
precisely, Bushman et al. (2004) document that financial transparency is higher in countries with 
low state ownership in companies and banks and low risk of state expropriation of firms’ wealth. 
In the same line of reasoning, Chen and Hao (2011) argue that political institutions may affect 
the country’s information environment and thus shareholders’ ability to monitor firms. In light of 
these arguments, we expect that firms originating in countries where political institutions are 
weak and consequently suffer from corporate opacity are more likely to choose the least 
constraining cross-listing programs (i.e., OTC and PORTAL rather than the exchange-listed 
programs). This is especially the case after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).  
As foreign firms cross-listed on U.S. markets originate in countries with different political 
structures, our study offers a unique opportunity to examine the impact of political institutions on 
the choice of the U.S. cross-listing venue. Indeed our sample of cross-listed shares covers 44 
countries over the period 1990 to 2007. We consider two measures of the quality of political 
institutions. Our primary variable of interest is the index of political rights from Freedom House 
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(2010). This index indicates how people and political parties can freely participate in the 
country’s political development. We consider Henisz’s (2005) executive constraint index as an 
alternative measure of the quality of political institutions. This index assesses the extent of 
constraints on the exercise of executive power. 
We use a multinomial logit model to assess the impact of the quality of political institutions on 
the choice of the cross-listing program. Our results suggest that firms from countries with weak 
political institutions are more likely to cross-list on OTC and less likely to opt for an exchange-
listing program (NYSE, Nasdaq, or AMEX). We find no evidence that the quality of political 
institutions affects the likelihood of a foreign firm opting for PORTAL. Our findings are robust 
to controlling for the various firms’ characteristics, the quality of the home country’s legal 
institutions, and several sensitivity tests.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on cross-listing 
choice and the role of political institutions. Section 3 presents the data and descriptive statistics. 
Section 4 covers the empirical evidence. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Cross-listings and the choice of a U.S. venue: Related literature 
In this section, we present the different types of cross-listings on U.S. markets followed by a 
discussion of the firms’ motives for cross-listing. We then develop our hypothesis concerning the 
impact of political institutions on the choice of the U.S. cross-listing venue.  
 
2.1. How do foreign firms cross-list in the U.S.?  
Cross-listing in the U.S. is mainly achieved through ADRs or direct listings. ADRs are 
negotiable certificates that represent a foreign firm’s publicly traded equity or debt. A firm that 
decides to issue an ADR can choose one of four options: Level I, Level II, Level III, and Rule 
144A. Foreign firms that cross-list their shares on U.S. markets can choose either exchange-
listed or unlisted programs. Level II and Level III ADRs and direct listing are exchange-listed 
programs, whereas Level I and Rule 144A are unlisted programs. We group Level II and Level 
III ADRs and direct listings under exchange-listed programs since foreign firms that choose 
these listing options adopt the same disclosure and regulatory requirements as U.S. firms listed 
on these exchanges. Exchange-listed programs are traded on one of the major U.S. exchanges 
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(i.e., NYSE, Nasdaq, and AMEX). Unlisted programs are either traded on OTC markets 
(including Level I ADRs) or on the PORTAL system (Rule 144 ADRs) among Qualified 
Institutional Buyers (QIB).  
 
2.2. The motives for U.S. cross-listing 
Several motives lead foreign firms to cross-list on U.S. markets. Cross-listing allows firms to 
raise new funds at a lower cost (Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Lins et al., 2005; Doidge et al., 
2009), to increase their visibility via greater analyst coverage (Baker et al., 2002), and to 
improve the liquidity of their shares and broaden their shareholder base (Pagano et al., 2002; 
Aggarwal et al., 2007). In addition, the bonding hypothesis, first advanced by Coffee (1999) and 
Stulz (1999), posits that foreign firms may seek to “bond” themselves to stringent U.S. rules to 
protect their minority shareholders when the legal and financial institutions of their domestic 
countries are weak. Considerable research supports the bonding hypothesis (e.g., Reese and 
Weisbach, 2002; Doidge, 2004, Doidge et al., 2004, 2009; Lel and Miller, 2008).  
Nonetheless, the bonding hypothesis has been challenged,
2
 in particular by Siegel (2005), who 
documents a weak level of enforcement by the SEC against cross-listed Mexican firms. Siegel 
introduces the reputational bonding hypothesis according to which foreign firms bond 
themselves to build a reputation that subsequently allows them to raise capital on U.S. markets.
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In contrast, Licht (2003) advances the avoiding hypothesis, which posits that foreign firms are 
more likely to avoid more stringent regulations. Licht et al. (2011) further state that the bonding 
and avoidance hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. In the same vein, Stulz (2009, p. 349) 
notes that “some firms will choose stronger securities laws than those of the country in which 
they are located and some firms will do the opposite.” In support of both the bonding and 
avoiding hypotheses, Boubakri et al. (2010) document that some foreign firms from countries 
with weak legal institutions who wish to issue a capital raising ADR select an exchange-listed 
program (Level III) while others choose an unlisted ADR program (Rule 144A) to avoid meeting
 
stringent U.S. regulations. 
                                                          
2
 See Karolyi (2010) for a thorough discussion of the evidence on the bonding hypothesis. 
3 Interestingly, in an experimental study from the 1994-1995 Mexican crisis, Siegel (2009) also shows that cross-
border alliances with a multinational firm which involve joint investments in fixed assets are a better mechanism 
than cross-listings to ensure good corporate governance. 
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While several studies have examined legal institutions as a determinant of U.S. cross-listing 
(e.g., Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Boubakri et al., 2010), to the best of our knowledge, no study 
has yet examined the impact of political institutions on the decision to cross-list in the U.S. and 
the venue choice. The objective of this paper is to fill this gap and to establish whether political 
institutions play a determining role in the choice of the U.S. cross-listing venue.  
 
2.3. Political institutions and the choice of the U.S. cross-listing venue 
Bushman et al. (2004, p.208), who define corporate transparency as “the availability of firm-
specific information to those outside the publicly-traded firms” show that financial transparency 
in a country is mainly related to the political regime of this country. Specifically, the authors find 
that financial transparency is superior in countries with a low state ownership of firms and a low 
risk of state expropriation of firms’ profits. Likewise, Chen and Hao (2011) point out that the 
presence of inefficient political institutions would weaken the quality of the general information 
environment and thus limit the ability of shareholders to monitor the managers of firms 
domiciled in these countries. Similarly, Piotroski and Wong (2010) argue that the benefits of 
opacity in many developing countries characterized by high levels of ownership concentration, 
politicized institutions, and corruption are likely to prevail over the benefits of transparency. 
Stulz (2005) also argues that, in countries where state expropriation risk is high, firm managers 
who are more inclined to consume private benefits are not encouraged to enhance financial 
disclosure because it would make state expropriation easier.  
Given the above discussion, we conjecture that firms domiciled in a weak corporate transparency 
environment are unwilling to meet the stringent U.S. exchange rules, especially after the 
enactment of SOX . There are two reasons for which we enunciate this conjecture. First, firms 
originating in countries with weak political institutions may find that financial transparency costs 
outweigh the benefits reaped from listing on the main U.S. exchanges. Therefore, these firms 
adopt the least constraining cross-listing programs. Second, as discussed in Piotroski and Wong 
(2010), the benefits of opacity might outweigh the benefits of transparency, leading foreign firms 
to choose the least constraining U.S. cross-listing programs. In other words, controlling for firm-
level and other country-level variables, we conjecture that: 
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Firms originating in countries where political institutions are weak are more likely to choose the 
least constraining cross-listing programs (OTC and PORTAL) as compared to the exchange-
listed programs (i.e., NYSE, Nasdaq, and AMEX). 
3. Data description and methodology 
3.1. Data sources and sample characteristics 
Our sample consists of all the U.S. cross-listed shares issued from 1990 to 2007. The initial 
sample comes from Boubakri et al. (2010) who covered ADRs issued during the period from 
1990 through 2006. We have updated this sample with ADRs issued in 2007 and we have 
augmented it with all the direct (non-ADR) cross-listings during the period 1990 through 2007. 
ADR data are collected from the major depositary bank websites: Bank of New York, Citibank, 
the Deutsche Bank, and JPMorgan. We extract from these websites the type of ADR, the 
effective issuance date, the market where the ADR is traded, the sponsorship status, the 
underlying share and its country of origin, the ADR number given by the Committee on Uniform 
Securities Identification Procedures (CUSIP), and the International Securities Identification 
Number (ISIN) of the underlying share. We verify the ADR’s characteristics using Lexis-Nexis, 
NASDAQ, NYSE, and the firm’s websites. For the non-ADR cross-listed shares (direct listing 
and New York Registered shares), we obtain the name of the firms, type of listing from the 
NYSE, Nasdaq, and AMEX websites. The CUSIP and listing date are collected from the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database.  
Our sample only includes cross-listed shares that were issued between 1990 and 2007 and that 
are still active as of December 2007. Furthermore, firms that are included in our sample must 
have first issued shares in their local home market prior to cross-listing in the U.S. The ADR 
portion of our sample only includes sponsored ADRs. We exclude ADRs that change from their 
initial levels since we cannot get full details about these changes, namely the first ADR and the 
issuance date. We also
 
eliminate subsequent ADRs that a firm may have issued, ADRs that have 
debt as an underlying security, and side-by-side ADRs that consist of a combination of Level 1 
and Rule 144A for the same underlying stock. As Rule 144A (PORTAL) was introduced in 
1990, we only consider ADRs and other cross-listed programs issued after 1990. 
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The final sample consists of 786 cross-listed shares. We present summary statistics of this 
sample in Table 1. Appendix 1 displays the cross-listed shares issued by year for a sample of 786 
issues between 1990 and 2007. This appendix also presents the average number of cross-listed 
shares issued in the pre- and post-SOX periods.  
Following the World Bank country group classification, Panel B of Table 1 indicates that 38.7% 
(total of 304) of the cross-listed shares are from firms located in the Asia/Pacific geographical 
region. Europe follows with 33.7% (total of 265) of the cross-listed shares. Canada represents 
14% (total of 110) of the 786 cross-listed shares. All of these 110 shares are issued under the 
direct listing programs. The Latin American region represents 10.2% (total of 80) of the 786 
cross-listed shares.  Panel C breaks down the number of issuances per industry in accordance 
with Campbell’s (1996) classification: 21.8% (total of 171) of the cross-listed shares are issued 
by firms in basic industries. Finance and real estate follow with 15.3% (total of 120) of the cross-
listed shares.  
Our sample consists of 362 (45.9%) cross-listed shares issued on the OTC, 285 (36.1%) on major 
U.S. exchanges (including direct listing shares), and 139 (18%) under private placements 
(PORTAL) for a total of 786 cross-listed shares.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
3.2. Assessing political and legal institutions 
North (1981, p. 201) defines institutions as “a set of rules, compliance procedures, and moral and 
ethical behavioral norms designed to constrain the behavior of individuals in the interests of 
maximizing the wealth or utility of principals.” Given this definition, Glaeser et al. (2004) and Qi 
et al. (2010) argue that good measures of political institutions should reflect the ex ante view of 
constraints on government behavior rather than the ex post government performance. 
Furthermore, measures of government expropriation and government effectiveness reflect 
governments past restraint and quality; hence they are not necessarily the best measures of future 
political outcomes. The variable we choose to assess political institution efficiency is the 
“political rights” index developed by Freedom House (2010).4 It is an ex ante proxy of the future 
outcomes of the political bargaining process. The political rights index ranges from one to seven, 
                                                          
4 See La Porta et al. (1999), Acemoglu et al., (2008), and Qi et al. (2010) for the use of this political rights index. 
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with a score of one representing the best opportunity for individuals (e.g., business leaders, 
shareholders) to act spontaneously outside government control and domination. As such, 
individuals have greater freedom from arbitrary intervention in their objectives and pursuits
 
by 
the government. The highest score (of one) also indicates a political system where free and fair 
elections are conducted, candidates who are elected actually rule, the opposition can actively 
contest the political party in power, and minority groups can contribute to informal consensus 
with the party in power and the opposition (Freedom House).  
As an alternative measure of political institution efficiency, we extract from the political 
constraint index of Henisz (2000) the executive constraint index from the Polity database and 
Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (see Jaggers and Gurr, 1996; 
Henisz, 2005; Marshall and Jaggers, 2009). This ex ante index measures the extent of 
institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether 
individuals or collectivities. The constraints may be imposed by any “accountability groups” 
such as legislatures in Western democracies. Other kinds of accountability groups are the ruling 
party of a one-party state, powerful advisors in monarchies, and the military in coup-prone 
polities. The index ranges from one to seven, with a score of one indicating stronger executive 
constraints, hence better political institutions.
5
  
Our measure of the effectiveness of the legal system will be the difference in the anti-self-
dealing indices between the firm’s home country and the U.S., as developed by Djankov et al. 
(2008). The anti-self-dealing index measures the legal protection of minority shareholders 
against “managerial self-dealing” and private benefit extraction. Using the differences in these 
indices, we establish a link between the desires of a non-U.S. firm to bond to U.S. regulations 
and to select a cross-listing program. To confirm the robustness of our results, we also consider 
alternative legal institution variables: (1) the difference in the accounting ratings between the 
cross-listed firm’s home country and the U.S. constructed by La Porta et al. (1998); (2) a dummy 
variable equal to one if the legal origin of the cross-listed firm’s home country is common law 
and zero otherwise; and (3) the difference in the revised anti-director rights indices between the 
cross-listed firm’s home country and the U.S. (Djankov et al., 2008). Table 3 lists the means of 
all political and legal institution variables for each country. 
                                                          
5 To be consistent with the political rights index, we reversed the ratings of the political constraint index so that for 
both variables a higher score indicates weaker political institutions. 
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
3.3. Control variables 
We control for various accounting and financial characteristics of firms measured one year 
before the cross-listing date. Appendix 2 describes the data definitions and sources for all the 
firms and institutional variables used in this study. We control for the natural logarithm of total 
assets (SIZE), pre-tax income (INCOME), and the liquidity of the underlying share relative to 
local stock market (TURNVOL). We expect that larger and more profitable firms are more likely 
to cross-list on major U.S. exchanges as these exchanges require that (1) firms pay registration 
and continuing fees and (2) meet earnings and size requirements. Firms with a higher turnover 
volume are also more likely to opt for exchange listings to improve their liquidity and overcome 
the financial constraints of their local market.  
We also control for growth opportunities (ASSETGR) and firm leverage (LEV) as these firms 
are more likely to issue equity offerings to finance their operations. Consequently, given that 
only Level III (exchange listings) and PORTAL allow capital-raising, we expect that the higher 
the leverage ratio and growth opportunities of foreign firms, the more likely it is that these firms 
choose either exchange listings or PORTAL. In the same vein, privatized firms (PRIV) are more 
likely to choose PORTAL and exchange listings since these cross-listings provide the option for 
governments to raise capital and divest gradually through subsequent primary equity offerings.  
As documented in Lins et al. (2005), emerging market firms are more capital constrained. These 
firms may then seek access to U.S. markets through either exchange listings or PORTAL. We 
thus introduce a dummy variable for firms domiciled in emerging markets (EMC).  
The enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 has likely had an influence on the 
foreign firms’ choice of cross-listing venues. The implementation of SOX raised the costs of 
exchange cross-listings by obliging firms to comply with more stringent new rules and 
regulations. Since SOX, foreign firms have been more likely to cross-list through PORTAL or 
OTC because it allows these firms to raise capital (PORTAL) or simply list on U.S. markets 
(OTC) with no particular compliance with SOX requirements.  
It is also necessary to account for the ownership structure of the cross-listed firms. Doidge et al. 
(2009) state that when controlling shareholders have tighter control over a firm’s operations, they 
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are more reluctant to cross-list on exchange listings because the costs of extracting private 
benefits of control exceed those gained by cross-listing on major U.S. exchanges. Further, 
Claessens et al. (2000) emphasize that controlling shareholders are less likely to extract private 
benefits of control from minority shareholders when the separation between control and cash 
flow rights is less pronounced. Hence, we control for both the ultimate shareholder control rights 
(ULOW) and the difference between the control and cash flow rights (ULOWDIF). 
The literature also provides evidence that legal institutions do matter in the world of cross-
listing. For instance, Boubakri et al. (2010) show that legal institutions explain the choice of the 
type of cross-listing. Their results suggest that firms from countries with weak legal institutions 
are more likely to bond to stringent regulations.
6
 They also show that some firms prefer to avoid 
stringent regulations by listing via PORTAL. The avoiding and bonding hypotheses do not 
appear to be mutually exclusive (Stulz, 2009; Licht et al., 2011). We thus control for the quality 
of legal institutions. However, we do not expect the quality of a country’s legal institutions to 
play a major role in the choice of a U.S. cross-listing once we have accounted for the quality of 
political institutions in the home country of the cross-listed firms. As emphasized by Roe and 
Siegel (2009), investor protection is a policy choice that is a reflection of political interest, the 
quality of political institutions, and political preferences. When political institutions are weak 
“…whatever formal legal rules are transplanted – the core of legal origin perspective – are 
unlikely to make a difference” (Roe and Siegel, 2009 p.790). Also as noted by Eleswarapu and 
Venkataraman (2006), the rule of law can only prevail in the presence of a strong and 
independent judicial system, which in turn relies on the efficiency of the political system. 
3.4. Model presentation 
Once the decision to cross-list in the U.S. is taken, the firm’s managers must select a type of 
cross-listing. Their set of choices includes three types of cross-listings: over-the-counter (OTC), 
exchange listings (NYSE, Nasdaq, and AMEX), and PORTAL. We opt for a multinomial logit to 
test our main hypothesis since we have more than two outcomes.  
In a multinomial logit model, the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA, hereafter) 
hypothesis implies that adding an additional alternative (i.e., a choice) or changing the 
                                                          
6
 We obtain the same results if we follow Boubakri et al.’s (2010) approach by only breaking down our ADR sample 
into four groups (ADR levels I, II, III, and Rule 144A). 
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characteristics of a third alternative do not affect the relative probability for any other two 
alternatives. The IIA therefore implies that all alternatives are equally similar or dissimilar 
(Hensher et al., 2005). To assess the IIA hypothesis, we use the Hausman and McFadden (1984) 
test to compare the estimation of the parameter vector β for different subsets of alternatives. 
Therefore, if IIA is shown to be true, the use of any subset of alternatives will consistently 
estimate β.  
In a multinomial logit model, we cannot estimate all the coefficients for all the cross-listing 
choices. Consequently, the model is unidentified and we choose a base outcome to eliminate this 
issue. A base choice in which all the coefficients are set to 0 leads to the interpretation that the 
estimated coefficients measure change relative to the chosen base outcome. The choice of the 
base outcome is arbitrary and does not impact the predicted marginal effects or probabilities 
(Greene, 2003). In this study, the base outcome consists of the cross-listing shares that trade on 
the OTC.  
We report the results of our tested hypothesis by estimating the marginal effects of the 
multinomial logit model estimation for the three cross-listing choices. We also assume the choice 
of cross-listing programs to be available to all firms that choose to list in the U.S. As explained 
in Boubakri et al., (2010), NYSE and NASDAQ can allow a foreign firm to list on their 
exchange despite the firm’s inability to meet the exchanges’ requirements in terms of size, 
profitability, earnings, and number of shareholders.  
4. Empirical results 
Table 3 presents correlation coefficients for our variables of interest. The two political 
institutional variables, political rights (PRIGHTS) and executive constraint (XCONST), and the 
legal institutional variables are not highly correlated. This finding suggests that these variables 
capture different effects. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Table 4 presents the expected signs of the political, legal, and control variables. The marginal 
effects of the regression coefficient of several variables (asset growth, leverage, firm from an 
emerging/non-emerging country, privatization, and SOX) are undetermined because our study 
12 
 
combines both capital and non-capital raising cross-listed programs (e.g., ADR levels II and III) 
under the same venue (i.e., exchange-listing programs). 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
4.1. Univariate Analysis 
Table 5 presents the means of the explanatory variables for the different types of cross-listing. 
Differences in the variable means between the different types of cross-listing and OTC are tested 
using a two-tailed t-test of means.  
The results, displayed in Table 5, for the means of political rights (PRIGHTS) and executive 
constraint (XCONST) suggest that firms that cross-list via the exchange-listing programs come 
from countries with more efficient political institutions than firms listed on the OTC. The means 
of the political rights and executive constraint variables likewise suggest that firms listed via 
PORTAL have relatively weaker political institutions than firms listed on the OTC.  
Firms from countries with weak legal institutions (i.e., with a higher difference, in absolute 
value, in the anti-self-dealing index between the firms’ home countries and the U.S.) are more 
likely to list on exchange listings and PORTAL than on OTC. These univariate results tend to 
support both the avoiding and bonding hypotheses.  
As for the other firm-specific variables, we note that the pre-tax incomes and asset growth rates 
of exchange-listed firms are higher than those of OTC firms. Firms listed on PORTAL also post 
higher asset growth and are more leveraged than OTC listed firms. Our results also show that 
newly privatized firms are more likely to list on exchanges than on OTC so as to have a broader 
shareholder base to raise funds and to issue subsequent equity. Exchange-listed firms have 
significantly lower ultimate ownership control rights and private benefits of control than firms 
listed on the OTC. These results confirm Doidge et al.’s (2009) position on the reluctance of 
firms that wish to preserve their benefits of control to issue shares on U.S. exchanges. 
Furthermore, firms that list via PORTAL are more likely to come from emerging markets and 
post higher private benefits of control as shown by the ultimate ownership of control rights.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
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4.2. Multivariate analysis 
Table 6 reports the marginal effects of multinomial logit estimations. As discussed in section 
3.4., we test for Hausman-McFadden’s IIA assumption for all the specifications. The results of 
the Hausman-McFadden test suggest that we cannot reject the IIA assumption for all the 
specifications. Consequently, we estimate multinomial logit models while correcting for 
clustering at the country level. 
We also report McFadden’s pseudo R2 and the percentage of the correctly classified observations 
predicted by each model. These two statistics gauge the power and goodness of fit for each 
estimated model (Hensher et al., 2005).  
We perform the multivariate analysis for our two key political institution variables, namely 
political rights (PRIGHTS) and executive constraint (XCONST). Both political institution 
variables have a strong and statistically significant impact on the choice of the cross-listing 
venue. Panels A and B of Table 6 show that foreign firms from countries with poor political 
institutions are more likely to list on the OTC market. More specifically, an increase of one unit 
in the political rights index raises the probability of cross-listing via OTC by 0.1558 (Panel A) 
and 0.1417 (Panel B). These results are statistically significant at the 1% level. In contrast, 
foreign firms from countries with poor political institutions are less likely to choose an 
exchange-listed program. More precisely, a one unit increase in the political rights index reduces 
the probability of listing on U.S. exchanges by 0.1242 (Panel A) and 0.1183 (Panel B). These 
results are statistically significant at the 5% level. The political rights measure has no predictive 
power for the decision of foreign firms to cross-list shares via a private placement (PORTAL). 
Overall, this evidence suggests that political institutions, measured using an ex ante variable (an 
index of political rights), contribute to predicting the choice of two cross-listing venues in the 
U.S. (the OTC and U.S. exchanges). Furthermore, it appears that firms from countries with weak 
political institutions are more likely to avoid exchange-listings and thus the stringent legal and 
disclosure regulations.  
Panels C and D report the evidence using our alternative measure of political institutions, which 
is the executive constraint index (XCONST). Panel C shows that an increase of one unit in the 
executive constraint index decreases (increases) the probability that a foreign firm lists on U.S. 
exchanges (the OTC) by 0.1121 (0.1453). These results are statistically significant at the 5% and 
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1% levels, respectively. Such results suggest that foreign firms from countries with weaker 
executive constraints are more likely to cross-list on OTC but that they are less likely to list on 
U.S. exchanges. Once we control for the anti-self-dealing index (Panel D), a one unit increase in 
the executive constraint index raises the probability of listing on the OTC by 0.1409 (significant 
at the 1% level) and also decreases the probability of listing on an exchange by 0.1098 
(significant at the 5% level). Similar to political rights, executive constraint has no statistically 
significant predictive power on the probability of listing via PORTAL. 
The results, shown in Panels B and D, indicate that the legal institution variable we consider, the 
anti-self-dealing index, has no statistically significant impact on the choice of the U.S. cross-
listing venue. This evidence suggests that, once we control for political institutions, the level of 
legal protection for minority shareholders in the home-countries of the cross-listed firms does not 
predict the desire of these firms to conform to or to avoid stringent U.S. regulations.  
Panels A to D show that the higher the firm’s pre-tax income (INCOME) and the higher the asset 
growth rate (ASSETGR), the more likely it is that the firm chooses a U.S. exchange program.  
These results for the role of pre-tax income are consistent with the predicted relations shown in 
Table 4, since to list on any U.S. exchange, firms have to meet minimum earnings requirements. 
These results are also consistent with the predicted relations shown in Table 4 that conjecture 
that firms with high growth opportunities generally need to raise fresh capital and therefore are 
less likely to choose OTC, which does not offer this possibility. All panels of Table 6 suggest 
that firms with high leverage (LEVERAGE) are more likely to cross-list on the OTC and via 
PORTAL and less likely to list on an exchange.  
To sum up, these results reveal that more profitable firms are more likely to list on U.S. 
exchanges by meeting earnings requirements. Furthermore, firms with higher asset growth are 
more likely to issue equity offerings via exchange listings and PORTAL so as to pursue growth 
opportunities. Finally, indebted firms are more likely to finance operations through PORTAL 
and less likely to do so via exchange listings.  
As shown in Panel A, the fact that a firm comes from an emerging country (EMC) increases the 
probability that it lists via PORTAL by 0.4113 (significant at the1% level) and decreases the 
probability of it listing on the OTC by 0.3715 (significant at the 5% level). This result suggests 
that firms from emerging countries may be more tempted to avoid U.S. regulations to meet their 
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needs to raise fresh capital. Privatization (PRIV) through U.S. cross-listings increases the 
likelihood that a foreign firm chooses to list on a major U.S. exchange by 0.2984 (significant at 
the 5% level) and decreases the probability of listing on the OTC by 0.5220 (significant at the 
1% level). This evidence suggests the need of the newly-privatized firms to raise funding from a 
larger pool of investors and to divest a large government stake among U.S. investors, thereby 
benefiting from the liquid U.S. markets. This opportunity is particularly valuable for these firms, 
which are often large and which resort to subsequent equity issues. 
Lastly, the results of the SOX dummy variable confirm Boubakri et al.’s (2010) findings, 
consistent with Zingales’ (2006) claim that foreign firms are more likely to issue private 
placement cross-listing shares after 2002, both to avoid U.S. legal liability and the increase in 
cost of issuance on an exchange, and to tap the U.S. primary market for institutional investors.  
Overall, the results of the multivariate models uphold both the evidence from the univariate 
analysis and the expected relations between the explanatory variables and the probability of 
choosing a given type of U.S. cross-listing venue. In particular, we show that foreign firms from 
countries with weak political institutions are more likely to cross-list in the U.S. via the over-the-
counter market and less likely to opt for an exchange-listed program. We also show that the legal 
institution environments in the foreign firms’ home-countries do not influence the choice of the 
U.S. cross-listing venue. In the following section, we conduct additional tests to ensure the 
robustness of our findings. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
4.3. Sensitivity tests 
4.3.1. Additional firm control variables 
We report further tests by including additional control variables for which we have a smaller 
number of observations. Panels A and B of Table 7 include the relative turnover variable, which 
we measure as the ratio of the turnover volume of the underlying firm to the local stock market’s 
turnover volume (TURNVOL). The results suggest that the higher the relative turnover, the 
greater the probability that the foreign firm cross-lists via PORTAL. Panels A and B also show 
16 
 
that the results for the political rights and anti-self-dealing index variables are qualitatively 
similar.  
Panel C includes two additional variables of private benefits of control, the ultimate control 
rights (ULOW) and the difference between the ultimate control rights and the ultimate cash flow 
rights (ULOWDIF). Panel C shows that firms with ultimate owners who have more control than 
cash flow (ULOWDIF) rights are more likely to cross-list on the OTC (5% level). This panel 
also suggests that the introduction of these variables does not affect the impact of political rights 
on the choice of the U.S. cross-listing venue (significant at the 5% level rather than at the 1% 
level).  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
We also conducted additional tests on the type of shareholder that may impact the cross-listing 
choice, since the consumption of private benefits of control may vary with the shareholder type. 
We first re-estimate the models of Panel C of Table 6 with a dummy equal to one if the largest 
shareholder is a foreigner. The unreported results show that this foreign shareholder and the 
difference in control and cash flow rights (ULOWDIF) increase the probability of listing on the 
OTC (significant at the 5% level) for both independent variables. When the largest shareholder is 
foreign, the probability of listing on exchanges or via PORTAL decreases (significant at the 10% 
level). The statistical significance of political rights remains unchanged. Lastly, we re-conduct 
the same test but with a dummy variable equal to one if the largest shareholder is either a family, 
a members of management, or a head of an unlisted firm. The unreported results reveal that the 
impact of political institutions on the choice of the U.S. cross-listing venue is qualitatively 
similar.  
4.3.2. A channel of weak political institutions: socio-political instability 
Following Qi et al. (2010) who consider political stability as one aspect of political rights, we 
examine how socio-political instability (as measured by the SPI index) can affect the choice of 
the U.S. cross-listing venue. We employed the SPI index constructed by Alesina and Perotti 
(1996). In keeping with these authors, we use the principal component analysis of the following 
four variables: politically motivated assassinations, revolutions, purges of political opposition, 
and an indicator variable of the degree of democracy using data from Banks (2010) and Freedom 
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House (2010). The SPI index of a country measures the average political instability over a 19-
year window prior to the year in question, and is thus a measure of political institution efficiency. 
It is constructed for the year 1990 to 2007.
7
 The specifications, shown in Table 8, do not include 
the variable PRIGHTS because it is strongly correlated with SPI.  
The results of Table 8 show that socio-political instability affects the cross-listing choice with 
regard to the OTC and U.S. exchanges. These results are consistent with the predicted relations 
in Table 4. More precisely, a one unit increase in socio-political instability increases the 
probability of listing on the OTC by 0.2331 and 0.2361 (1% significance level). The probability 
of listing on exchanges decreases by 0.2131 and 0.2141 (5% significance level). The socio-
political instability index has no impact on the cross-listing choice via PORTAL. This result 
reinforces our main findings on the impact of political institution quality on the cross-listing 
choice.
8
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
4.3.3. Sample composition
9
  
The sample of cross-listed firms that are considered for the multinomial logit results and 
presented in Table 6 includes financial and real estate firms. Financial and real estate firms have 
different characteristics from those of non-financial firms (e.g., leverage). Therefore, we exclude 
both financial and real-estate companies from the baseline model of Panel A, Table 6. The 
unreported results are qualitatively similar. The coefficients of political rights remain statistically 
significant for both cross-listings on the OTC and the U.S. exchanges (1% and 5% level 
respectively). Additionally, since we have ownership data for only 378 firms out of our initial 
786 sample size, we can question whether our results hold true for this sub-sample. The 
estimated results for this sub-sample are generally consistent with those of the whole sample. 
We also re-estimated Table 7 Panel C, by excluding foreign firms where the State is the largest 
shareholder. For state-owned firms, the ultimate owner (in this case, the State), tends to have 
higher ultimate control rights than non-state-owned firms. We find that ultimate cash flow rights 
                                                          
7
 Data on the degree of democracy (not free, partially free, and free) from Freedom House (2010) is available from 
1972, hence our 19 year window calculation for the SPI average.  
8
 Following Roe and Siegel (2011) and Qi et al. (2010), we also construct the SPI variable with a moving index with 
decay rates of 1%, 5%, and 10%. This produces similar results. 
9
 The unreported results mentioned in this section are available from the authors upon request. 
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and the difference between control and cash flow rights increase the probability of choosing an 
OTC cross-listing (10% level) venue and that ultimate cash flow rights decrease the probability 
of listing on a U.S. exchange (10% level). These results are consistent with our predictions in 
Table 5. More importantly, we find that the impact of political rights on both OTC and exchange 
listings is qualitatively similar.  
4.3.4. Alternative legal institutional variables 
To establish the robustness of our results, we consider three alternative legal institution variables 
to replace the difference in the anti-self-dealing indices between the firm’s home country and the 
U.S.: first, the difference in the accounting ratings between the foreign country and the U.S. 
constructed by La Porta et al. (1998); second, a dummy variable equal to one if the foreign firm 
is from a country where its legal origin is common law and zero otherwise; and third, the 
difference in the revised anti-director rights indices between the foreign country and the U.S. 
(Djankov et al., 2008).
10
 We then re-estimate the baseline scenario of Table 6, Panel B. The 
results, reported in Table 9, reveal that none of the three alternative legal institution variables 
affect the choice of the U.S. cross-listing venue, while the impact of political rights on the three 
types of cross-listing remains unchanged.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
5. Conclusion 
The objective of this paper was to assess the impact of political institutions on foreign firms’ 
choice of their U.S. cross-listing venue. Using two measures of political institutions (an index of 
political rights and a political constraint index) and controlling for various firm-level and 
country-level characteristics, we show that foreign firms from countries with weak political 
institutions are more likely to cross-list in the U.S. via the over-the-counter market and less 
likely to opt for an exchange-listing program (i.e., NYSE, Nasdaq, AMEX). We also show that 
the quality of legal institutions does not affect the choice of the U.S. cross-listing venue. This 
evidence suggests that political institutions rather than legal institutions affect  the choice of the 
                                                          
10
 We also test our model without taking the difference between the foreign country and the U.S. The results remain 
the same.  
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U.S. cross-listing venue.. Further tests reveal that our results are robust to alternative legal and 
political institutional measures. 
These findings have broad implications for firms and policymakers. Stronger political 
institutions improve the level of financial and corporate transparency as firms are more likely to 
cross-list on U.S. exchange programs. Future research may examine how the quality of political 
institutions affects the choice of the stock market (e.g., New York versus London) where the firm 
wishes to cross-list its shares as well as assess the impact of the cross-listing choice on the firm’s 
valuation. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Type of Cross-
Listing 
    Total 
Percentage 
(%) 
Panel A: Countries OTC 
Exchange 
listings 
Private 
placements 
    
Argentina   4 2 6 0.8% 
Australia 48 8 2 58 7.4% 
Austria 13 
 
1 14 1.8% 
Belgium 2 1 
 
3 0.4% 
Brazil 9 14 7 30 3.8% 
Canada   110 
 
110 14.0% 
Chile 2 8 1 11 1.4% 
China 15 6 
 
21 2.7% 
Colombia 1 
  
1 0.1% 
Denmark   1 
 
1 0.1% 
Finland 2 1 1 4 0.5% 
France 10 14 2 26 3.3% 
Germany 18 10 1 29 3.7% 
Greece 2 3 2 7 0.9% 
Hong Kong 48 5 1 54 6.9% 
India 1 9 24 34 4.3% 
Indonesia 2 
 
1 3 0.4% 
Ireland 7 3 
 
10 1.3% 
Israel   2 1 3 0.4% 
Italy 4 4 1 9 1.1% 
Japan 28 14 
 
42 5.3% 
Korea 1 8 11 20 2.5% 
Luxembourg 1 1 
 
2 0.3% 
Malaysia 8 
  
8 1.0% 
Mexico 15 5 6 26 3.3% 
Netherlands 6 6 1 13 1.7% 
Nigeria   
 
1 1 0.1% 
Norway 4 2 1 7 0.9% 
Pakistan   
 
3 3 0.4% 
Peru 1 
  
1 0.1% 
Philippines 2 1 2 5 0.6% 
Poland 2 
 
5 7 0.9% 
Portugal 4 
  
4 0.5% 
Russia 12 
 
11 23 2.9% 
Singapore 7 
 
1 8 1.0% 
South Africa 11 2 1 14 1.8% 
Spain 3 3 1 7 0.9% 
Sweden 8 2 1 11 1.4% 
Switzerland 4 4 1 9 1.1% 
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Taiwan   7 36 43 5.5% 
Thailand 5 
  
5 0.6% 
Turkey 2 
 
7 9 1.1% 
United Kingdom 50 26 3 79 10.1% 
Venezuela 4 1 
 
5 0.6% 
Total (44) 362 285 139 786 
 
Percentage (%) 45.9% 36.1% 18.0% 100% 
 
 
  
    
Panel B: Geographic 
location (countries) 
  
    
Asia/Pacific (13) 165 58 81 304 38.7% 
Europe (19) 152 81 32 265 33.7% 
Latin America (7) 32 32 16 80 10.2% 
Middle East/Africa 
(4) 
13 4 10 27 3.4% 
North America (1)   110 
 
110 14.0% 
 
  
    
Total (44) 362 285 139 786 
 
Percentage (%) 45.9% 36.1% 18.0% 100% 
 
 
  
    
 
  
    
Panel C: Industry 
classification 
  
    
Industry classification    
    
Basic industries 66 85 20 171 21.8% 
Capital goods 21 9 11 41 5.2% 
Consumer durables 37 25 31 93 11.8% 
Construction 10 3 3 16 2.0% 
Finance/Real estate 55 43 22 120 15.3% 
Food/Tobacco 19 10 7 36 4.6% 
Leisure 20 5 5 30 3.8% 
Pretroleum 14 17 7 38 4.8% 
Services 38 26 6 70 8.9% 
Textiles/Trade 20 5 6 31 3.9% 
Transportation 16 7 9 32 4.1% 
Utilities 42 41 7 90 11.5% 
Miscellaneous 4 9 5 18 2.3% 
 
  
    
Total 362 285 139 786 
 
Percentage (%) 45.9% 36.1% 18.0% 100% 
 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for a sample of 786 cross-listed shares issued between 1990 and 2007. In 
Panel A we present the number of issuances of cross-listing types (over-the-counter, exchange listings, and 
PORTAL) per country. Based on the World Bank country group classifications, we provide the distribution of the 
issuing firms’ home-countries by geographic location in Panel B.  Panel C presents the industry classification of 
these firms according to Campbell (1996). 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics by country 
Panel A. This table reports means for the institutional variables used in our multinomial 
logit. All variables are described in Appendix 2. 
 
Country PRIGHTS XCONST SELFDEAL ANTDIR ACRAT 
Argentina 2 2.33 -0.21 -1 -26 
Australia 1 1 0.14 1 4 
Austria 1 1 -0.44 -0.5 -17 
Belgium 1 1 -0.11 0 -10 
Brazil 2.4 2 -0.36 2 -17 
Canada 1 1 -0.01 1 3 
Chile 1.64 1 -0.02 1 -19 
China 7 5 0.13 -2 . 
Colombia 4 2 -0.07 0 -21 
Denmark 1 1 -0.18 1 -9 
Finland 1 1 -0.19 0.5 6 
France 1 2 -0.27 0.5 -2 
Germany 1 1 -0.37 0.5 -9 
Greece 1 1 -0.42 -1 -16 
Hong Kong 4.91 . 0.31 2 -2 
India 2 1 -0.1 2 -14 
Indonesia 4 3.33 0.03 1 . 
Ireland 1 1 0.14 2 . 
Israel 1 1 0.07 1 -7 
Italy 1 1 -0.26 -1 -9 
Japan 1 1 -0.17 1.5 -6 
Korea 1.55 2 -0.19 1.5 -9 
Luxembourg 1 . -0.45 -1 . 
Malaysia 4.63 3.62 0.3 2 5 
Mexico 2.62 2.42 -0.47 0 -11 
Netherlands 1 1 -0.44 -0.5 -7 
Nigeria 4 3 -0.22 1 -12 
Norway 1 1 -0.21 0.5 3 
Pakistan 6 5.33 -0.24 1 . 
Peru 5 5 -0.24 0.5 -33 
Philippines 2.2 2 -0.41 1 -6 
Poland 1 1 -0.41 -1 . 
Portugal 1 1 -0.16 -0.5 -35 
Russia 5.43 3.39 -0.17 1 . 
Singapore 5 5 0.35 2 7 
South Africa 1.21 1 0.16 2 -1 
Spain 1 1 -0.28 2 -7 
Sweden 1 1 -0.31 0.5 12 
Switzerland 1 1 -0.38 0 -3 
27 
 
Taiwan 1.93 1.93 -0.09 0 -6 
Thailand 3.4 1.6 0.2 1 -7 
Turkey 3.44 1 -0.22 0 -20 
United Kingdom 1 1 0.28 2 7 
Venezuela 3 3 -0.56 -2 -31 
      
. = data not available           
 
Panel B. Descriptive statistics for the variables used in our main multinomial logit model. 
All variables are described in Appendix 2. 
 
 
PRIGHTS XCONST SELFDEAL ANTDIR ACRAT SIZE INCOME ASSETGR LEVERAGE 
Mean 1.98 1.55 -0.06 0.95 -3.68 13.82 0.47 33.40 19.98 
S.d. 1.63 1.04 0.24 1.01 8.84 2.69 1.14 61.90 18.53 
Min 1.00 1.00 -0.56 -2.00 -35.00 8.11 -0.11 -39.64 0.00 
Max 7.00 6.00 0.35 2.00 12.00 19.07 6.16 291.42 67.86 
The political institution variables are the political rights index (PRIGHTS) of Freedom House (2010), which 
varies from1 to 7, with 1 being the ideal perceived political institution efficiency; and a measure of 
institutionalized constraints on the decision-making power of chief executives (XCONST) by the Polity 
database and Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) (see Marshall and 
Jaggers, 2009), with a higher score indicating stronger executive constraints. The institutional variables are 
the differences in the anti-self dealing index (SELFDEAL), the revised anti-director rights index (ANTDIR) 
introduced by Djankov et al. (2008), and the accounting ratings (La Porta et al.,1998)  between the firm’s 
home country and the U.S.. The firm variables are the natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of US 
dollars (SIZE),  the pre-tax income in billions of US dollars (INCOME),  the one year total assets growth 
(ASSETGR), and the total debt divided by the total assets (LEVERAGE).   
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Table 3 
Correlation coefficients 
The table provides the correlation coefficients of key variables for the cross-listing choice. The variables’ definitions and 
sources are described in Appendix 2. The sample period is 1990-2007.  
  SIZE INCOME ASSETGR LEVERAGE PRIV SOX EMC SELFDEAL ANTDIR COMLAW ACRAT PRIGHTS XCONST 
SIZE 1.00 
            INCOME 0.55 1.00 
           ASSETGR -0.26 -0.12 1.00 
          LEV 0.38 0.05 -0.18 1.00 
         PRIV 0.16 0.05 -0.06 0.09 1.00 
        SOX -0.14 0.03 0.02 -0.05 -0.11 1.00 
       EMC 0.06 -0.17 0.01 0.20 0.07 -0.03 1.00 
      SELFDEAL -0.23 -0.05 0.00 -0.15 -0.13 0.08 -0.22 1.00 
     ANTDIR -0.07 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.17 0.07 -0.04 0.59 1.00 
    COMLAW -0.40 -0.10 0.11 -0.34 -0.14 0.12 -0.28 0.81 0.53 1.00 
   ACRAT -0.17 0.06 0.00 -0.24 -0.14 0.04 -0.60 0.67 0.38 0.62 1.00 
  PRIGHTS 0.04 -0.14 0.01 0.12 0.04 -0.11 0.70 -0.07 0.01 -0.12 -0.34 1.00 
 XCONST 0.10 -0.09 -0.04 0.12 0.03 -0.15 0.55 -0.12 -0.09 -0.23 -0.20 0.79 1.00 
 
The firm variables are the natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of US dollars (SIZE), the pre-tax income in billions of US dollars (INCOME), 
the one year total assets growth (ASSETGR), and the total debt divided by the total assets (LEVERAGE). The governance and ownership variables are 
the privatization dummy (PRIV), which is equal to 1 if the firm was privatized by cross-listing and 0 otherwise,  the Sarbanes-Oxley dummy (SOX), 
which is equal to 1 if the firm issues a cross-listing after April 23, 2002 and 0 otherwise, and an emerging market dummy (EMC), which is equal to 1 if 
the country of origin of the cross-listing is an emerging market based on Standard and Poor’s Emerging Market Database, and 0 otherwise. The 
institutional variables are the differences in the anti-self dealing index (SELFDEAL), the revised anti-director rights index (ANTDIR) introduced by 
Djankov et al. (2008), the accounting ratings (La Porta et al.,1998)  between the firm’s home country and the U.S., and a dummy variable  (COMLAW) 
which is equal to 1 if the firm’s country legal origin is common law and 0 otherwise. The political institution variables are the political rights index 
(PRIGHTS) of Freedom House (2010), which varies from 1 to 7, with 1 being the ideal perceived political institution efficiency; and a measure of 
institutionalized constraints on the decision-making power of chief executives (XCONST) by the Polity database and Interuniversity Consortium for 
Political and Social Research (ICPSR) (see Marshall and Jaggers, 2009), with a higher score indicating stronger executive constraints. 
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Table 4 
Determinants of an issuer’s cross-listing decisions 
Variables Label   Probability of choosing a cross-listing 
      OTC Exchange-listings PORTAL 
Firm SIZE 
 
- + - 
 
INCOME 
 
- + - 
 
ASSETGR 
 
- -/+ + 
 
LEVERAGE 
 
- -/+ + 
 
TURNVOL 
 
- + - 
 
EMC 
 
-/+ -/+ + 
 
PRIV 
 
- -/+ + 
 
SOX 
 
-/+ -/+ + 
 
ULOW 
 
+ - + 
 
ULOWDIF 
 
+ - + 
      
Legal institutions SELFDEAL 
 
-/+ + -/+ 
 
ACRAT 
 
-/+ + -/+ 
 
ANTDIR 
 
-/+ + -/+ 
 
COMLAW 
 
-/+ + -/+ 
      
Political 
institutions 
PRIGHTS 
 
+ - + 
  XCONST   + - + 
 
This table reports the predicted signs of the variables that we include in our model for cross-listing choice, 
namely, over-the-counter or OTC, exchange listings (NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX), and PORTAL. The 
firm variables are: the natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of US dollars (SIZE); the pre-tax 
income in billions of US dollars (INCOME); the one year total assets growth (ASSETGR); the total debt 
divided by the total assets (LEVERAGE); and the yearly turnover volume of the firm divided by the yearly 
turnover volume of its country of origin’s market (TURNVOL). The governance and ownership variables 
are: the privatization dummy (PRIV), which is equal to 1 if the firm was privatized by cross-listing and 0 
otherwise; the Sarbanes-Oxley dummy (SOX), which is equal to 1 if the firm issues a cross-listing after 
April 23, 2002 and 0 otherwise; the ultimate control right (ULOW); the difference between the ultimate 
control and cash flow rights (ULOWDIF); and an emerging market dummy (EMC), which is equal to 1 if  
the country of origin of the cross-listing is an emerging market based on Standard and Poor’s Emerging 
Market Database, and 0 otherwise. The legal institution variable is the difference in the anti-self dealing 
index (SELFDEAL) and the revised anti-director rights index (ANTDIR) introduced by Djankov et al. 
(2008). The political institution variables are: the political rights index (PRIGHTS) of Freedom House 
(2010), which varies from1 to 7, with 1 being the ideal perceived political institution efficiency; and a 
measure of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making power of chief executives (XCONST) by 
the Polity database and Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) (see Marshall 
and Jaggers, 2009), with a higher score indicating stronger executive constraints.  
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Table 5  
Univariate analysis: comparison between cross-listing venues in the U.S.  
Comparison between ADR programs             
Variables Type of Cross-Listing             
 
OTC   
 
Exchange listings   Portal   
  Obs. Mean   Obs. Mean   Obs. Mean 
SIZE 362 13.75 
 
285 13.76 
 
139 14.11 
     
(0.95) 
  
(0.13) 
INCOME 362 0.36 
 
285 0.69*** 
 
139 0.31 
     
(0.00) 
  
(0.57) 
ASSETGR 362 22.95 
 
285 44.02*** 
 
139 38.83*** 
     
(0.00) 
  
(0.00) 
LEVERAGE 362 22.47 
 
285 13.6*** 
 
139 26.56** 
     
(0.00) 
  
(0.03) 
TURNVOL 281 0.02 
 
201 0.02 
 
82 0.01 
     
(0.72) 
  
(0.22) 
EMC 362 0.42 
 
285 0.26*** 
 
139 0.88*** 
     
(0.00) 
  
(0.00) 
PRIV 362 0.00 
 
285 0.06*** 
 
139 0.10*** 
     
(0.00) 
  
(0.00) 
SOX 362 0.54 
 
285 0.44*** 
 
139 0.60 
     
(0.01) 
  
(0.23) 
ULOW 179 28.76 
 
157 23.07** 
 
42 41.61*** 
     
(0.02) 
  
(0.00) 
ULOWDIF 179 7.76 
 
157 2.06*** 
 
43 2.54* 
     
(0.00) 
  
(0.06) 
SELFDEAL 362 -0.01 
 
285 -0.08*** 
 
139 -0.17*** 
     
(0.00) 
  
(0.00) 
PRIGHTS 362 2.28 
 
285 1.41*** 
 
139 2.35 
     
(0.00) 
  
(0.70) 
XCONST 313 1.65 
 
279 1.29*** 
 
138 1.83 
          (0.00)     (0.15) 
 
This table presents the mean of the different variables for the three types of cross-listing, namely over-the-
counter or OTC, exchange listings (NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX), and PORTAL. Our sample consists of 
786 cross-listings issued between 1990 and 2007. The firm variables are: the natural logarithm of total 
assets in thousands of US dollars (SIZE); the pre-tax income in billions of US dollars (INCOME); the one 
year total assets growth (ASSETGR); the total debt divided by the total assets (LEVERAGE); and the 
yearly turnover volume of the firm divided by the yearly turnover volume of its country of origin’s market 
(TURNVOL). The governance and ownership variables are: the privatization dummy (PRIV), which is 
equal to 1 if the firm was privatized by cross-listing and 0 otherwise; the Sarbanes-Oxley dummy (SOX), 
which is equal to 1 if the firm issues a cross-listing after April 23, 2002, and 0 otherwise; the ultimate 
control right (ULOW); the difference between the ultimate control and cash flow rights (ULOWDIF); and 
an emerging market dummy (EMC), which is equal to 1 if the country of origin of the cross-listing is an 
emerging market based on Standard and Poor’s Emerging Market Database, and 0 otherwise. The legal 
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institution variable is the difference in the anti-self dealing index (SELFDEAL). The political institution 
variables are: the political rights index (PRIGHTS) of Freedom House (2010), which varies from 1 to 7, 
with 1 being the ideal perceived political institution efficiency; and a measure of institutionalized 
constraints on the decision-making power of chief executives (XCONST) by the Polity database and 
Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) (see Marshall and Jaggers, 2009), 
with a higher score indicating stronger executive constraints. All the firm variables, except for SOX and 
PRIV, are taken one year before the issuing of the cross-listing. Differences in the means of the variables 
between the different types of cross-listings and OTC (the base outcome) are tested using a two-tailed t-test 
of means. P-values of this test are reported in parentheses.  
*, ** , *** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 6  
Multivariate analysis: multinomial logit of the choice between the three cross-listing venues 
 
Panel Type of listing SIZE INCOME ASSETGR LEVERAGE PRIV SOX EMC SELFDEAL PRIGHTS XCONST 
Number 
of obs. 
Pseudo 
R2 
(%) 
Correctly 
classified 
obs. (%) 
A OTC -0.0097 -0.0513** -0.0017*** 0.0068** 
-
0.5220*** 0.0871 -0.3715** 
 
0.1558*** 
 
786 22.8 65.01 
  
(0.5593) (0.0403) (0.0000) (0.0468) (0.0000) (0.1503) (0.0151) 
 
(0.0018) 
    
 
Exchange-
listings 0.0087 0.0545*** 0.0004** -0.0088** 0.2984** 
-
0.1612*** -0.0397 
 
-0.1242** 
    
  
(0.5592) (0.0046) (0.0136) (0.0195) (0.0300) (0.0024) (0.7572) 
 
(0.0116) 
    
 
Portal 0.0011 -0.0031 0.0004** 0.0020** 0.2236 0.0741* 0.4113*** 
 
-0.0316 
    
  
(0.8782) (0.8820) (0.0136) (0.0231) (0.1341) (0.0653) (0.0001) 
 
(0.1894) 
    
               
B OTC -0.0063 -0.0531** -0.0016*** 0.0069** 
-
0.5200*** 0.0887 -0.3386** 0.1763 0.1417*** 
 
786 23.2 64.89 
  
(0.6986) (0.0497) (0.0000) (0.0463) (0.0000) (0.1376) (0.0396) (0.3673) (0.0044) 
    
 
Exchange-
listings 0.0073 0.0567*** 0.0013*** -0.0088** 0.3222** 
-
0.1606*** -0.0393 -0.0524 -0.1183** 
    
  
(0.6123) (0.0058) (0.0001) (0.0200) (0.0181) (0.0024) (0.7635) (0.7619) (0.0177) 
    
 
Portal -0.0010 -0.0036 0.0003** 0.0019** 0.1978 0.0720* 0.3779*** -0.1239 -0.0234 
    
  
(0.8960) (0.8691) (0.0370) (0.0217) (0.1705) (0.0573) (0.0010) (0.2432) (0.3290) 
    
               
C OTC -0.0140 -0.0454* -0.0016*** 0.0068** 
-
0.4791*** 0.1140* -0.3027** 
  
0.1453*** 730 22 61.64 
  
(0.4208) (0.0583) (0.0000) (0.0432) (0.0000) (0.0502) (0.0326) 
  
(0.0024) 
   
 
Exchange-
listings 0.0105 0.0520** 0.0013*** -0.0089** 0.2926** 
-
0.1783*** -0.1260 
  
-0.1121** 
   
  
(0.5121) (0.0110) (0.0001) (0.0180) (0.0291) (0.0015) (0.3186) 
  
(0.0322) 
   
 
Portal 0.0035 -0.0067 0.0003* 0.0021** 0.1866 0.0643* 0.4286*** 
  
-0.0331 
   
  
(0.6308) (0.7514) (0.0526) (0.0267) (0.1948) (0.0804) (0.0000) 
  
(0.1879) 
   
               
D OTC -0.0120 -0.0463* -0.0016*** 0.0069** 
-
0.4788*** 0.1117** -0.2880* 0.1050 
 
0.1409*** 730 22.1 61.78 
  
(0.4742) (0.0676) (0.0000) (0.0433) (0.0000) (0.0496) (0.0544) (0.6060) 
 
(0.0040) 
   
 
Exchange-
listings 0.0096 0.0531** 0.0013*** -0.0089** 0.2987** 
-
0.1770*** -0.1268 -0.0420 
 
-0.1098** 
   
  
(0.5407) (0.0137) (0.0001) (0.0183) (0.0267) (0.0013) (0.3173) (0.8295) 
 
(0.0374) 
   
 
Portal 0.0025 -0.0068 0.0003* 0.0020** 0.1801 0.0653* 0.4148*** -0.0630 
 
-0.0311 
   
    (0.7385) (0.7539) (0.0724) (0.0255) (0.2088) (0.0700) (0.0001) (0.5491)   (0.2016)       
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This table reports the multinomial logit estimates of the choice between the cross-listing programs, namely over-the-counter (OTC), exchange listings 
(NYSE, NASDAQ, AMEX), and PORTAL. This table  reports the marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables for cross-
listings issued between 1990 and 2007. The firm variables are: the natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of US dollars (SIZE); the pre-tax 
income in billions of US dollars (INCOME); the one year total assets growth (ASSETGR); and the total debt divided by the total assets (LEVERAGE). 
The governance and ownership variables are: the privatization dummy (PRIV), which is equal to 1 if the firm was privatized by cross-listing and 0 
otherwise; the Sarbanes-Oxley dummy (SOX), which is equal to 1 if the firm issues a cross-listing after April 23, 2002, and 0 otherwise; and an 
emerging market dummy (EMC), which is equal to 1 if the country of origin of the cross-listing is an emerging market based on Standard and Poor’s 
Emerging Market Database, and 0 otherwise. The legal institution variable is the difference in the anti-self-dealing index (SELFDEAL) between the 
firm’s home country and the U.S., as introduced by Djankov et al. (2008). The political institution variables are: the political rights index (PRIGHTS) 
of Freedom House (2010), which varies from 1 to 7, with 1 being the ideal perceived political institution efficiency; and a measure of institutionalized 
constraints on the decision-making power of chief executives (XCONST) by the Polity database and Interuniversity Consortium for Political and 
Social Research (ICPSR) (see Marshall and Jaggers, 2009), with a higher score indicating stronger executive constraints. All the firm variables, except 
for SOX and PRIV, are taken one year before the issuing of the cross-listing. To gauge the power and fit of each estimated model, we rely on the 
Pseudo R
2 
and the percentage of correctly classified observations predicted by the model. For PRIV, SOX, and EMC, the marginal effect is calculated 
as a discrete change from 0 to 1. The reported results use OTC as the base outcome and are corrected for clustering at the country level. Values 
between parentheses represent the p-values of the t-test for the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero.  
* Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; and *** statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 7  
Multivariate analysis: multinomial logit of the choice between the three cross-listing venues with additional firm control variables 
Panel 
Type of 
listing SIZE INCOME ASSETGR LEVERAGE TURNVOL PRIV SOX ULOW ULOWDIF EMC SELFDEAL PRIGHTS 
Number 
of obs. 
Pseudo 
R2 
(%) 
Correctly 
classified 
obs. (%) 
A OTC -0.0090 -0.0516** -0.0014*** 0.0080* 0.6767 
-
0.5584*** 0.1402*** 
  
-0.4207** 
 
0.1958*** 564 26.40 67.02 
  
(0.6140) (0.0241) (0.0003) (0.0563) (0.4542) (0.0000) (0.0091) 
  
(0.0250) 
 
(0.0019) 
   
 
Exchange-
listings 0.0075 0.0433** 0.0012*** -0.0089** 0.2324 0.4500** 
-
0.1753*** 
  
-0.0404 
 
-
0.1725*** 
   
  
(0.6432) (0.0354) (0.0013) (0.0374) (0.7784) (0.0440) (0.0007) 
  
(0.7485) 
 
(0.0013) 
   
 
Portal 0.0015 0.0084 0.0002* 0.0009 -0.9091** 0.1084 0.0351 
  
0.4611*** 
 
-0.0232 
   
  
(0.7675) (0.6381) (0.0748) (0.1238) (0.0379) (0.5381) (0.1995) 
  
(0.0017) 
 
(0.2275) 
   
                 
B OTC -0.0082 -0.0513** -0.0014*** 0.0081* 0.6593 
-
0.5561*** 0.1400*** 
  
-0.3999** 0.0584 0.1887*** 564 26.70 67.02 
  
(0.6435) (0.0297) (0.0004) (0.0538) (0.4658) (0.0000) (0.0098) 
  
(0.0484) (0.7781) (0.0052) 
   
 
Exchange-
listings 0.0074 0.0438** 0.0012*** -0.0089** 0.2255 0.4684** 
-
0.1761*** 
  
-0.0347 0.0060 
-
0.1692*** 
   
  
(0.6489) (0.0346) (0.0016) (0.0377) (0.7867) (0.0254) (0.0007) 
  
(0.7922) (0.9737) (0.0035) 
   
 
Portal 0.0009 0.0075 0.0002* 0.0008 -0.8848** 0.0877 0.0361 
  
0.4347*** -0.0644 -0.0195 
   
  
(0.8722) (0.6932) (0.0974) (0.1360) (0.0267) (0.5725) (0.1863) 
  
(0.0051) (0.3767) (0.3005) 
   
              
378 27.90 69.58 
C OTC -0.0036 -0.0753** -0.0016*** 0.0073* 
 
-
0.4951*** 0.0331 0.0021 0.0136** -0.3599 0.1696 0.2078** 
   
  
(0.8808) (0.0278) (0.0005) (0.0684) 
 
(0.0004) (0.6757) (0.1682) (0.0255) (0.1144) (0.4870) (0.0247) 
   
 
Exchange-
listings -0.0006 0.0966*** 0.0016*** -0.0074* 
 
0.4348*** -0.0707 -0.0024 -0.0116 0.0644 -0.0822 -0.2037** 
   
  
(0.9780) (0.0093) (0.0002) (0.0807) 
 
(0.0036) (0.3406) (0.1443) (0.1107) (0.7270) (0.7188) (0.0282) 
   
 
Portal 0.0042 -0.0213 -0.0000 0.0001 
 
0.0603 0.0376** 0.0003 -0.0020 0.2955** -0.0874 -0.0041 
   
    (0.5054) (0.3163) (0.8778) (0.8503)   (0.5989) (0.0346) (0.5994) (0.2531) (0.0157) (0.1469) (0.6940)       
 
This table reports the multinomial logit estimates of the choice between the cross-listing programs, namely over-the-counter (OTC), exchange listings (NYSE, NASDAQ, 
AMEX), and PORTAL with additional firm variables. This table reports the marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables for cross-listings issued 
between 1990 and 2007. The firm variables are: the natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of US dollars (SIZE); the pre-tax income in billions of US dollars (INCOME); 
the one year total assets growth (ASSETGR); the total debt divided by the total assets (LEVERAGE); and the yearly turnover volume of the firm divided by the yearly turnover 
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volume of its country of origin’s market (TURNVOL). The governance and ownership variables are: the privatization dummy (PRIV), which is equal to 1 if the firm was 
privatized by cross-listing and 0 otherwise; the Sarbanes-Oxley dummy (SOX), which is equal to 1 if the firm issues a cross-listing after April 23, 2002, and 0 otherwise; the 
ultimate control right (ULOW); the difference between the ultimate control and cash flow rights (ULOWDIF); and an emerging market dummy (EMC), which is equal to 1 if 
the country of origin of the cross-listing is an emerging market based on Standard and Poor’s Emerging Market Database, and 0 otherwise. The legal institution variable is the 
difference in the anti-self-dealing index (SELFDEAL) between the firm’s home country and the U.S., as introduced by Djankov et al. (2008). The political institution variable 
is the political rights index (PRIGHTS) of Freedom House (2010), which varies from 1 to 7, with 1 being the ideal perceived political institution efficiency. All the firm 
variables, except for SOX and PRIV, are taken one year before the issuing of the cross-listing. To gauge the power and fit of each estimated model, we rely on the Pseudo R
2
. 
For PRIV, SOX, and EMC, the marginal effect is calculated as a discrete change from 0 to 1. The reported results use OTC as the base outcome and are corrected for clustering 
at the country level. Values between parentheses represent the p-values of the t-test for the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero.  
* Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; and *** statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 8 
Multivariate analysis: multinomial logit of the choice between the three cross-listing venues with the Socio-Political Instability index 
Panel 
Type of 
listing SIZE INCOME ASSETGR LEVERAGE PRIV SOX EMC SELFDEAL SPI 
Number 
of obs. 
Pseudo 
R2 (%) 
Correctly 
classified 
obs. (%) 
A OTC -0.0092 -0.0525** -0.0016*** 0.0063* -0.4765*** 0.1069* -0.3323*** 
 
0.2331*** 732 21.20 59.42 
  
(0.5977) (0.0281) (0.0000) (0.0558) (0.0000) (0.0671) (0.0098) 
 
(0.0089) 
   
 
Exchange-
listings 0.0090 0.0561*** 0.0013*** -0.0087** 0.2874** -0.1775*** -0.0701 
 
-0.2131** 
   
  
(0.5560) (0.0066) (0.0001) (0.0181) (0.0422) (0.0011) (0.5059) 
 
(0.0329) 
   
 
Portal 0.0002 -0.0037 0.0003 0.0024*** 0.1891 0.0707* 0.4025*** 
 
-0.0200 
   
  
(0.9752) (0.8497) (0.1086) (0.0066) (0.2037) (0.0672) (0.0008) 
 
(0.6743) 
   
              
B OTC -0.0070 -0.0535** -0.0015*** 0.0065* -0.4767*** 0.1057* -0.3243** 0.1322 0.2361*** 732 21.50 61.2 
  
(0.6651) (0.0277) (0.0000) (0.0541) (0.0000) (0.0654) (0.0150) (0.4962) (0.0091) 
   
 
Exchange-
listings 0.0086 0.0574*** 0.0013*** -0.0087** 0.3026** -0.1771*** -0.0659 -0.0188 -0.2141** 
   
  
(0.5448) (0.0077) (0.0001) (0.0185) (0.0338) (0.0009) (0.5446) (0.9223) (0.0359) 
   
 
Portal -0.0016 -0.0038 0.0002 0.0022*** 0.1741 0.0714* 0.3901*** -0.1134 -0.0220 
   
    (0.8303) (0.8481) (0.1629) (0.0078) (0.2365) (0.0554) (0.0021) (0.2425) (0.6383)       
 
This table reports the multinomial logit estimates of the choice between the cross-listing programs, namely over-the-counter (OTC), exchange listings (NYSE, NASDAQ, 
AMEX), and PORTAL. This table  reports the marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables for cross-listings issued between 1990 and 2007. The firm 
variables are: the natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of US dollars (SIZE); the pre-tax income in billions of US dollars (INCOME); the one year total assets growth 
(ASSETGR); and the total debt divided by the total assets (LEVERAGE). The governance and ownership variables are: the privatization dummy (PRIV), which is equal to 1 if 
the firm was privatized by cross-listing and 0 otherwise; the Sarbanes-Oxley dummy (SOX), which is equal to 1 if the firm issues a cross-listing after April 23, 2002, and 0 
otherwise; and an emerging market dummy (EMC), which is equal to 1 if the country of origin of the cross-listing is an emerging market based on Standard and Poor’s 
Emerging Market Database, and 0 otherwise. The legal institution variable is the difference in the anti-self-dealing index (SELFDEAL) between the firm’s home country and 
the U.S., as introduced by Djankov et al. (2008). The political institution variable is an index that measures the average of the socio-political instability of a country (SPI) over a 
19 year period. It is constructed using the principal component analysis of the variables assassinations, purges, and revolutions, as well as a score for democracy from Banks 
(2010) and Freedom House (2010), with a higher SPI indicating more instability. All the firm variables, except for SOX and PRIV, are taken one year before the issuing of the 
cross-listing. To gauge the power and fit of each estimated model, we rely on the Pseudo R
2 
and the percentage of correctly classified observations predicted by the model. For 
PRIV, SOX, and EMC, the marginal effect is calculated as a discrete change from 0 to 1. The reported results use OTC as the base outcome and are corrected for clustering at 
the country level. Values between parentheses represent the p-values of the t-test for the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero.  
* Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; and *** statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 9 
Alternative institutional variables 
 
Panel 
Type of 
listing SIZE INCOME ASSETGR LEVERAGE PRIV SOX EMC ANTDIR COMLAW ACRAT PRIGHTS 
Number 
of Obs. 
Pseudo 
R2 
(%) 
Correctly 
classified obs. 
(%) 
A OTC -0.0092 -0.0528** -0.0017*** 0.0068** 
-
0.5187*** 0.0879 -0.3734** 0.0155 
  
0.1568*** 786 22.90 65.39 
  
(0.5862) (0.0399) (0.0000) (0.0479) (0.0000) (0.1513) (0.0153) (0.7456) 
  
(0.0015) 
   
 
Exchange-
listings 0.0086 0.0543*** 0.0013*** -0.0088** 0.3192** 
-
0.1633*** -0.0375 -0.0005 
  
-0.1250** 
   
  
(0.5674) (0.0058) (0.0002) (0.0198) (0.0216) (0.0020) (0.7716) (0.9913) 
  
(0.0134) 
   
 
Portal 0.0006 -0.0015 0.0004** 0.0020** 0.1994 0.0753* 0.4109*** -0.0150 
  
-0.0318 
   
  
(0.9387) (0.9431) (0.0198) (0.0206) (0.1938) (0.0653) (0.0000) (0.5691) 
  
(0.1844) 
   
                
B OTC -0.0101 -0.0504** -0.0016*** 0.0066** 
-
0.5241*** 0.0890 -0.3698** 
 
-0.0149 
 
0.1577*** 786 23.10 65.90 
  
(0.4779) (0.0451) (0.0000) (0.0283) (0.0000) (0.1353) (0.0175) 
 
(0.9033) 
 
(0.0033) 
   
 
Exchange-
listings 0.0124 0.0534*** 0.0013*** -0.0084** 0.3234** 
-
0.1638*** -0.0124 
 
0.0718 
 
-0.1297** 
   
  
(0.3084) (0.0042) (0.0001) (0.0102) (0.0246) (0.0021) (0.9207) 
 
(0.5199) 
 
(0.0217) 
   
 
Portal -0.0023 -0.0030 0.0003** 0.0018** 0.2007 0.0748* 0.3822*** 
 
-0.0569 
 
-0.0279 
   
  
(0.7503) (0.8885) (0.0286) (0.0324) (0.1902) (0.0709) (0.0003) 
 
(0.3911) 
 
(0.2311) 
   
                
C OTC -0.0087 -0.0408 -0.0015*** 0.0074** 
-
0.5250*** 0.1563*** -0.4518** 
  
-0.0016 0.2427*** 717 24.80 66.25 
  
(0.5993) (0.1505) (0.0000) (0.0203) (0.0000) (0.0052) (0.0126) 
  
(0.8343) (0.0004) 
   
 
Exchange-
listings 0.0095 0.0682** 0.0011*** -0.0102*** 0.2339 
-
0.2213*** -0.0319 
  
-0.0010 
-
0.1995*** 
   
  
(0.5318) (0.0151) (0.0006) (0.0048) (0.1151) (0.0002) (0.8169) 
  
(0.884) (0.0004) 
   
 
Portal -0.0007 -0.0274 0.0003 0.0028*** 0.2911* 0.0650 0.4837*** 
  
0.0026 -0.0432 
   
    (0.9343) (0.4949) (0.1029) (0.0080) (0.0603) (0.1204) (0.0019)     (0.5693) (0.2108)       
 
This table reports the multinomial logit estimates of the choice between the cross-listing programs, namely over-the-counter (OTC), exchange listings (NYSE, 
NASDAQ, AMEX), and PORTAL with alternative legal institution variables. This table reports the marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables 
for cross-listings issued between 1990 and 2007. The firm variables are: the natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of US dollars (SIZE); the pre-tax income in 
billions of US dollars (INCOME); the one year total assets growth (ASSETGR); and the total debt divided by the total assets (LEVERAGE). The governance and 
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ownership variables are: the privatization dummy (PRIV), which is equal to 1 if the firm was privatized by cross-listing and 0 otherwise; the Sarbanes-Oxley dummy 
(SOX), which is equal to 1 if the firm issues a cross-listing after April 23, 2002, and 0 otherwise; and an emerging market dummy (EMC), which is equal to 1 if the 
country of origin of the cross-listing is an emerging market based on Standard and Poor’s Emerging Market Database, and 0 otherwise. The legal institution variables 
are: the difference in the revised anti-director rights index (ANTDIR) between the firm’s home country and the U.S., as introduced by Djankov et al. (2008); a common 
law (COMLAW) dummy equal to 1 if the firm’s home country is of common law origin and 0 otherwise (La Porta, 1998); and the difference in the accounting rating 
(ACRAT) between the firm’s home country and the U.S. (La Porta, 1998). The political institution variable is the political rights index (PRIGHTS) of Freedom House 
(2010), which varies from 1 to 7, with 1 being the ideal perceived political institution efficiency. All the firm variables, except for SOX and PRIV, are taken one year 
before the issuing of the cross-listing. To gauge the power and fit of each estimated model, we rely on the Pseudo R
2 
and the percentage of correctly classified 
observations predicted by the model. For PRIV, SOX, and EMC, the marginal effect is calculated as a discrete change from 0 to 1. The reported results use OTC as the 
base outcome and are corrected for clustering at the country level. Values between parentheses represent the p-values of the t-test for the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient is equal to zero.  
* Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; and *** statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Appendix 1 
Cross-listings issued by year 
Year Cross-listings     
 
Type 
   
  OTC Exchange-listings PORTAL Total 
1990 3 2 0 5 
1991 4 1 0 5 
1992 8 5 2 15 
1993 14 3 3 20 
1994 7 5 4 16 
1995 11 11 5 27 
1996 13 10 6 29 
1997 26 20 4 50 
1998 20 14 6 40 
1999 10 20 10 40 
2000 22 33 5 60 
2001 21 30 7 58 
2002 30 27 6 63 
2003 25 17 16 58 
2004 37 16 12 65 
2005 35 32 18 85 
2006 18 19 20 57 
2007 58 20 15 93 
Total 362 285 139 786 
Pre-SOX 
average 
13.3 12.8 4.3 30.42 
(1990-2001) 
    
Transition 2002 30 27 6 63 
Post-SOX 
average 
34.6 20.8 16.2 70.17 
(2003-2006)         
This Appendix presents the cross-listing programs chosen by year in a sample of 786 cross-listed firms between 
1990 and 2007. This Appendix also presents the average number of cross-listed shares issued during the pre- and 
post-SOX periods. Cross-listed firms are traded on either the OTC market, major U.S. exchanges (NYSE, 
Nasdaq, and AMEX), or Portal. 
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Appendix 2  
Variables, definitions, and sources 
Variable 
description 
Definitions Sources 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of U.S. dollars one 
year before issuing a cross-listing share 
Worldscope Disclosure. Economatic (for Latin 
American), Amadeus (for Europe), Orbis, country-
specific company handbooks, firm websites, and firm 
financial reports 
INCOME The pre-tax income in billions of U.S. dollars one year before issuing a 
cross-listing share 
 
ASSETGR The annual asset growth of the cross-listing firm one year before 
issuing a cross-listing share 
 
LEVERAGE The leverage ratio, which is equal to total debts divided by total assets 
one year before issuing a cross-listing share 
 
TURNVOL The ratio between the turnover volume of the underlying firm and the 
turnover volume of its local market one year before issuing a cross-
listing share 
Datastream 
PRIV A dummy variable that is 1 when the firm was privatized by issuing a 
cross-listing share and 0 otherwise 
World Bank, Privatization Barometer website, firm 
websites, and the Bank of New York 
SOX A dummy variable for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which is equal to 1 if 
one firm issues a cross-listing share after April 24 2002, and 0 
otherwise 
Bank of New York, Citibank, Deutsche Bank, and JP 
Morgan websites, Lexis/Nexis, NYSE website, CRSP, 
and Litvak (2007) 
ULOW The percentage of the total ultimate control rights held by the ultimate 
owner of the cross-listing firm one year before issuing a cross-listing 
share 
Worldscope Disclosure. Economatica (for Latin 
American), Amadeus (for Europe), Orbis, country-
specific company handbooks, firm websites, and firm 
financial reports 
ULOWDIF The percentage point difference between the ultimate control rights and 
the ultimate cash flow rights of the ultimate owner of the cross-listing 
firm one year before issuing a cross-listing share 
 
EMC A dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm's country of origin is an 
emerging market, and 0 otherwise 
Standard and Poor's Emerging market Database (EMDB) 
SELFDEAL The difference in the anti-self-dealing index between the firm's country 
of origin and the U.S.  
Djankov et al. (2008) 
ANTDIR The difference in the revised anti-director index between the firm's 
country of origin and the U.S. 
Djankov et al. (2008) 
ACRAT The difference in the accounting ratings between the firm's country of 
origin and the U.S. 
La Porta (1998) 
COMLAW A dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm's country legal origin is 
common law and 0 otherwise 
La Porta (1998) 
PRIGHTS An index of political rights varying from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating 
countries that come closest "to the ideals" suggested by the following 
questions: there are free and fair elections; those who are elected 
actually rule; there are competing parties or other competing political 
groupings; the opposition has an important role and has actual power; 
and minority groups have reasonable self-government or can participate 
in the government through informal consensus 
Freedom House (2010) 
XCONST Measures the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-
making power of chief executives, whether they be individuals or 
collectivities. The index varies from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating stronger 
executive constraints 
Polity database and Interuniversity Consortium of 
Political and Social Research (ICPSR); see Marshall and 
Jaggers (2009) 
 
